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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years Ukrainian banks have grown rapidly,
reflecting the improving operating environment as well as a rise in
public confidence in the banking system.' However, such rapid growth
in the banking sector raises concerns about risk management and the
corporate governance system in place. While the system can function
well in times of economic prosperity, periods of economic downturn can
lead to deterioration in asset quality and a systemic banking crisis. As
Fitch Country Report points out, a number of significant weaknesses
characterize the Ukrainian banking system, particularly low
capitalization and high concentration levels.2
The National Bank of Ukraine ("NBU") has a dual function. It
serves as the country's central bank, as well as the regulator of the
banking sector. It has increasingly toughened regulatory capital
requirements for banks.3 The NBU risk-based capital standards restrict
* LL.M expected, Banking Corporate and Finance Law, Fordham University School of
Law, 2006. The author served in 2004-2005 as a legal assistant on the Bank
Supervision Development Project in the National Bank of Ukraine (the Central Bank),
implemented by BearingPoint, Inc., sponsored by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). The author wishes to thank to Mr. Gary A.
Gegenheimer, Senior Attorney, Emerging Markets Sector, BearingPoint, Inc., for his
mentorship and deep insight of Ukrainian bank corporate governance practices.
1. See The Ukrainian Banking System, Fitch Country Report, at 1 (March 16,
2004), available at www.fitchratings.com.
2. Id.
3. E.g. scheduled increases in capital requirements for Ukrainian banks began on
January 1, 2006. Under NBU Regulation No. 368, local banks must hold at least C
1.4m, regional banks (for banks that carry out their activity on the territory of a specific
oblast) must hold at least f 4.5m, and national banks must hold at least E 7m.
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opportunities for further growth of the assets of Ukrainian banks, as do
limits on the amount of loans allowed to an individual borrower. Due to
these restrictions, Ukrainian banks eagerly seek new sources of capital.
Large banks have already outgrown the amount of capital that their
owners can contribute, thus necessitating capital additions from
"outsiders." In the absence of a developed national securities market,
the only possible choice for banks is to solicit foreign institutional
investors. However, the participation of foreign investors in Ukrainian
banks is not possible without transparency and the implementation of
principles of effective corporate governance. All these factors provide
banks with the incentive to change, increasing the demand for
implementation of modem corporate governance principles and best
practices. Nevertheless, even with strong demand for reforms and the
progress that has been made in recent years with Ukrainian corporate
governance, the banking sector has been very resistant to change. There
is much more to do in terms of filling gaps in corporate governance
practices.
II. BACKGROUND
Advancing corporate governance standards presents large cultural
hurdles for managers of Ukrainian banks. Over the last ten years, their
ownership structure and activities have remained relatively unchanged.4
This can be explained by the particular ownership culture in Ukraine.
Large financial industrial groups and politically influential individuals
have been reluctant to loosen control over their banks which too often
serve particular interests of these major shareholders. Pressure from
these major shareholders makes bank managers unable to change the
situation on their own; they expect regulators and legislators to be the
main driving force for the development of corporate governance
practices.
4. See International Finance Corporation (IFC), A Survey of Corporate
Governance Practices in the Ukrainian Banking Sector 7, available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/ubcg.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/UkraineBankingSurveyENG.pd
f/$FILE/UkraineBankingSurveyENG.pdf
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A. Corporate Governance in Ukraine
1. The Soviet Legacy
Corporate govemance is an extremely new concept in Ukraine.
Before 1991, Ukrainian corporate law had been based primarily on a
Soviet legal and economic doctrine that the state, as represented by
various governmental organizations and authorities, acts as owner of the
majority of large- and medium-sized enterprises in Ukraine.5 To put it
simply, there were no corporations. The state itself functioned as a huge
corporation, with a nexus of ministries and departments as its
management bodies. The whole notion of the principal-agent model in
Soviet Ukraine had a rather perverse nature. The idea of who is the
"principal" and who is an "agent" in terms of corporate governance was
very vague. In the Soviet Union, control over the management was
exercised by the state (i.e. various ministries and departments) through
bureaucratized administrative methods.6 The enterprises operated under
the conditions of soft budget constraints and stable state order, which
guaranteed them access to very cheap inputs and financial resources.7
State banks enthusiastically extended credit to enterprises without
guarantees of repayment from future income. The budget and state
subsidies in various forms also provided direct financing.8 In line with
socialist traditions, enterprises fixed costs and profit in accounting
reports. Any profit reflected in the documents did not provide any
tangible advantage for them, and losses did not change their behavior.
Managers were supposed to fulfill and over-fulfill planned targets set by
the state. 9 Thus, de facto, there were no principals in the Soviet Union;
5. See Oleg Batyuk, Shareholder Rights, Equitable Treatment and the Role of the
State, The Third Meeting of the Eurasian Corporate Governance Roundtable, at 2 (Apr.
17-18, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/28/2097823.pdf.
6. See Steven Lee Solnick, The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and
China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective, in WORLD POLITICS Vol. 48, at 223-30 (Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1996), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/world politics/
v048/48.2solnick.html
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Kostiantyn Shkurupiy, The Corporate Governance Environment in Ukraine
and its Impact on Corporate Performance and Finance 5, available at
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the formal owners of state property were the "Soviet people," who had
minimal influence on state policy and affairs, and thus their property.
The only actual risk for Ukrainian managers was the risk of party
disciplinary and state law-enforcement actions. A complicated system
of remuneration allowed top managers to receive decent salaries, high
bonuses, and other privileges. At the same time, they knew what would
have happened if they failed to fulfill the state plans. They would be
fired and expelled from the Communist party, terminating their career
path.' There were three types of control over the management in their
work: control exercised by the appropriate ministry, the party leader, and
the KGB representative.11 In addition, there was a so-called People's
Control, which was in fact another form of state control.' 2 As the former
Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk admitted, the overwhelming purpose
of Ukraine's legal system up to the time of the break-up of the Soviet
Union was to "catch and punish." 3
In the end, the Soviet system ultimately proved its economic
ineffectiveness. The Communist political elite split into two categories
- the "orthodoxes" and the "pragmatists." The latter were a new
generation of party elite, who were interested in using the capitalist
economy to make state property their own private property. The
collapse of the Soviet Union can, therefore, be viewed as a victory of the
"pragmatists" over the "orthodoxes." During Soviet times,
"pragmatists" adapted their work ethic: they formed a complex set of the
"right instincts" which became the rules of the game for a successful
career. These "instincts" included hypocrisy, law nihilism, and personal
loyalty to their patron. Although they publicly pushed for democratic
reforms and adopted concepts such as the free market, open competition,
and economic liberty, new Ukrainian rulers only did so to the extent
such change did not interrupt their de facto control over the main state
assets.
After Ukraine declared independence in 1991, the system of
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/0/1930649.pdf.
10. Idat 5.
11. See Solnick, supra note 6, at 215.
12. See David Lempert, The Proposed Constitution of Ukraine: Continuity Under
the Banner of Change, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: J. OF POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION,
Vol. 2 No. 2 (Spring 1994), http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%20Archives/
DEM%2002-02%201empert.pdf.
13. Id.
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governance existing with the Soviet Union radically changed through
the adoption of a number of legal acts by the new Ukrainian parliament,
which largely comprised of so-called "red directors."' 4  The "red
directors" were the former pragmatists - Communist Party and
Komsomol functionaries, managers, administrators or supervisors of big
enterprises, and their supporters.15 Poorly drafted and ambiguous laws
passed by the Ukrainian parliament and other levels of authority were
generally characterized by broad declarations of intent, and by the
absence of either conceptual coherence or specifics as to application or
enforcement.' 6 Subsequent processes of initial accumulation of private
capital initiated the formation of financial and industrial groups in
Ukraine.
All types of state control over managers ended once enterprises
were privatized, and should have been replaced by private owners'
control. However, under the conditions of a dispersed ownership and
small packages of shares allocated free of charge, managers perceived
themselves as the "only true owners of plants and factories" and did not
treat their employees with packages of shares as "principals."' 7 Lack of
control over the corporate behavior of managers by the state or new
owners led to the situation where the "red directors" managed to acquire
actual control over the companies and started to benefit substantially
from their operation.' 8
"Red directors" were gradually becoming de facto masters (having
right to dispose) of assets and profit of enterprises, launching the era
of shadow economy and corruption in Ukraine. Probation of
"schemes" for self-serving, self-dealing via leech firms, stripping of
assets, dubious bartering, flowing of capital abroad, etc. took place at
that time. Understandingly, that part of gained capital was used to
corrupt government officials and as pay to criminal and semi-
14. See Shkurupiy, supra note 9, at 4.
15. See Andrew Wilson and Clelia Rontoyanni, Security or Prosperity? Belorusian
and Ukrainian Choices, in SWORDS AND SUSTENANCE: THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY IN
BELARUS AND UKRAINE 23, 36 (Robert Legvold and Celeste A. Wallander eds., 2004).
16. See Daniel A. Bilak, Prometheus Unbound or Achilles Heel?: Implications of
Emerging Legal Structures in Ukraine for Foreign Investment, Practicing Law Institute
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, at 465 (Mar. 22-23, 1993).
17. See Shkurupiy, supra note 9, at 5.
18. Id.
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criminal groups, which provided protection and support to
businesses as well as contract enforcement.
Cooperative and criminal capital, stripped funds and skimmed profit
of enterprises as well as grabbed budgetary resources were
channeled to the statutory funds of investment companies and
investment funds, trust companies, banks and newly established
companies. A great deal of this capital has come in legalized form
from abroad mainly from offshore zones. Not being officially
formed as financial industrial groups on the basis of formal criteria
they are in fact typical banking-industrial holdings. Main objectives
of such amalgamations were to take control over group of enterprises
or sectors of industry and their financial flows. Control has been
achieved by acquisition of shares in privatization and at the
secondary market, accesses to the management of the state holdings
in these companies, by transfer of their accounts to affiliated banks,
by acquisition of assets during the bankruptcy procedure, etc.
Dubious history and their initial capital, past and present technology
of work make these groups conceal any kind of information
regarding them. It is extremely difficult to figure them out clearly in
horizontal and vertical planes, to assess accurately their financial
might, spheres of their control and all affiliated entities. Negative
perception of these groups by the society could be illustrated by
informal label stuck to them - clans and oligarchs.... As a rule
very important role in these industrial and financial groups belongs
to banks. Banks that are part of corporate groups own large stakes in
enterprises connected with banks' principals in their activity ....
Currently members of these financial and industrial groups practice
additional issues of shares and issues of corporate bonds since in this
case they have a chance to find support of other members and their
bank that would guarantee underwriting for these securities. 19
Since 1991, a system was created in Ukraine consisting of "crony
capitalism" with corrupted public-serving economic and political ideals,
entrenched ownership interests, and a hostile business and investment
climate. New Ukrainian corporations depended heavily on an extremely
close relationship between their new "owners" and state political and
governmental institutions rather than on market economy principles.
The relationships between these entities formed a kind of aristocratic
social hierarchy influenced by self-serving friendships and family ties.
Moreover, the new Ukrainian economy inherited from its Soviet past
19. Id. at 5, 6, 11, 12.
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severe structural problems which were heightened by the lack of any
regulatory regime (banking, corporate, or securities legislation) essential
to the proper functioning of market institutions. The weak banking
sector, a distorted tax system, bureaucracy, corruption, poor
transparency and corporate governance, and uncertainty over the rule of
law is a short list of problems left from the Ukrainian historical past.
2. Current law
The Law on Economic Companies, 20 adopted on September 19,
1991, is the foundation for corporate legislation in Ukraine. Although
this legislative act has undergone numerous amendments, it has lost
some of its regulatory functions and presently requires global
reconsideration.21 Part of the problem undoubtedly lies in the lack of a
comprehensive Stock Companies Law. A draft is currently being
considered by the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament), but this
process has been ongoing for more than five years.22 Corporate
governance provisions are also found in the new Civil Code,23 but the
provisions are too general and mostly contain references to special
legislation in particular areas of law. These documents lay the legal
foundation for organizing and operating entrepreneurial subjects as
entities regulated by private law. They also define the specific
characteristics of stock companies.
According to the Ukrainian Civil Code and the Law on Economic
Companies, the main bodies of corporate governance are: general
20. See generally Law of Ukraine on Economic Companies, No.1576-XII (Sept.
19, 1991), available at http://www.brama.com/law/businessl/businas.txt [hereinafter
Law on Economic Companies] (translated as "Law of Ukraine on Business
Associations").
21. Natalia Kuznetsova, The Legal Framework of Corporate Governance in
Ukraine, at 5, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/13/1930958.pdf.
22. See generally Draft Law of Ukraine "On Joint Stock Companies" No. 8326
(Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.rada.gov.ua:8080/pls/zweb/
webproc4_l?id=&pf35 11=25852 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). For reasons to adopt the
Stock Companies Law, see Darrin Hartzler and Hugh Patton, Why Ukraine Needs a
Joint Stock Company Law, IFC CORPoRATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, at 2 (June 1999),
available at http://www2.ifc.org/ukraine/ucdp/materials/bulletin/1999_04e.pdf.
23. See generally Civil Code of Ukraine, No. 435-IV (Jan. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.commerciallaw.com.ua/ukr/legislative/ENGL/.
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shareholders' meetings, a supervisory board, management and a revision
commission.14 The general shareholders' meeting is recognized as the
supreme body of a stock company, having practically unlimited
competence and authority. Ukrainian legislation determines the range of
topics on which the general shareholders' meeting can decide, and the
issues that cannot be delegated for consideration and resolution to other
bodies of stock companies.2 5 The company charter may refer additional
issues to the general shareholders' meeting except for those issues
stipulated by law.26 The law mandates that all corporations with greater
than fifty shareholders have a supervisory board.27 The board represents
the interests of the shareholders in the period between general
shareholders' meetings.28 Its main function is to control the activities of
the executive body (management board).29 In accordance with the
company's charter, some functions, which are referred to as functions
within the competence of the general shareholders' meeting, may be
delegated to the board of directors. Functions which may not be
delegated are a class exclusive to the competence of the general
shareholders' meeting.
The management board is the executive body that governs the
corporation's routine activities.3 ° It handles all the issues that arise from
the company's day-to-day activities, except for those that belong to the
competence of the general shareholders' meeting and the supervisory
board.3' The general meeting may decide to delegate some of its
24. Id. at arts. 159-61; Law on Economic Companies, supra note 20, at art. 41, 46,
47, 49. The "supervisory board" is the body that is elected by the shareholders to
represent them and to oversee the implementation of approved policies by the full-time
senior managers. The U.S. concept of "board of directors" corresponds to the concept
of "supervisory board."
25. See Civil Code of Ukraine, supra note 23, at art. 159 2; Law on Economic
Companies, supra note 20, at art. 49 9 5, 6.
26. See Civil Code of Ukraine, supra note 23, at art. 159 1; Law on Economic
Companies, supra note 20, at art. 41 1, 2.
27. Law on Economic Companies, supra note 20, at art. 46 3. Banks are an
exception to this rule; they need to establish supervisory boards regardless of the
number of shareholders. Many banks would actually fall under this exemption as they
have far less than 50 shareholders. See IFC, supra note 4, at 29.
28. Law on Economic Companies, supra note 20, at art. 46 1.
29. Id. at art. 46 1.
30. Id. at art. 49 1.
31. Id. at art. 49 3.
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authority to the management board.32 As the executive body of a stock
company, the management board is accountable to the supervisory board
and the general shareholders' meetings, and organizes the
implementation of their decisions.33
The management board is controlled by the revision commission,
members of which are elected by the shareholders.34 Members of the
management board, supervisory board, and other officials may not be
members of the revision commission.3 5 Functions, competence, and
organizational principles of activities for the bodies of corporate
governance of the company are merely outlined in a general form in the
Law on Economic Companies. As a rule, internal company by-laws
detail the functions of the general shareholders' meeting, the supervisory
board, management, and the revision commission. As a result, these
documents are adopted in different ways within individual companies,
and consequently possess local characteristics. Thus corporate
governance functions contain considerable deviations.
3. Current Practices
Current Ukrainian legislation contains a number of provisions that
constitute a good start in establishing effective corporate governance
practices. However, the law gives preference to the legal form and
ignores the substance. There are a number of loopholes that prevent
giving corporate stakeholders effective protections. For example, in
contrast to U.S. corporate legislation and shareholder-related legislation
in other states, Ukrainian corporate law does not integrate fundamental
concepts, such as fiduciary duties.36 Due to flaws in the Ukrainian
judicial system and the civil and labor laws, there are no adequate
mechanisms to hold officers and directors of stock companies
32. Id.
33. Civil Code of Ukraine, supra note 23, at art. 161 1; Law on Economic
Companies, supra note 20, at art. 47 4.
34. Law on Economic Companies, supra note 20, at art. 49 1.
35. Id. at art. 49 2.
36. The exception constitutes the banking legislation which provides that bank
managers (and directors), in carrying out their duties under the present Law, must act in
the best interest of the bank and its clients, and must consider the bank's interests
superior to their own. See Ukrainian Banking Law, infra note 40, at art. 43 1.
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responsible for causing harm to the company.
The gaps in the Ukrainian legislation likely occurred because of
several factors: the Ukrainian stock market has not been sufficiently
developed, and circulation of securities occurs in negligible volume.37
More than two-thirds of all Ukrainian stock companies were established
in the form of closed stock companies, shares of which, in accordance
with Article 25 of the Law of Ukraine On Economic Companies, cannot
be bought and sold in the market.3 8  Stock company charters often
stipulate that a shareholder who wants to sell his shares offer them to the
company or other shareholders first, and then only if the company or
other shareholders expressly refuse the shares, can the shareholder sell
to outsiders.39
In addition to the above-mentioned weaknesses, the appearance of
big strategic investors in the Ukrainian market forms a new need to
implement corporate governance principles. International creditors
often require, in addition to paying off past debts and as a condition of
the loan, that corporations improve their governance structures.
However, this is only done on an individual basis through private
agreements, and does not affect statewide legislation.
The banking sector is actually further developed than the general
business sector, insofar as the Law of Ukraine on Banks and Banking
Activities ("Banking Law") contains specific provisions regarding
governance and management of banks. 40 The legislation in the banking
sector is nearly compliant with all relevant European Union Directives.41
Unfortunately, due to ambiguity and internal conflicts in bank legislation
provisions, banks suffer from many of the same difficulties as other
types of business enterprise in Ukraine.
37. See Kuznetsova, supra note 21, at 1.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See generally The Law of Ukraine on Banks and Banking, No. 2121-IIl (Dec.
7, 2000), available at http://www.ukremb.com/business/docs/
law on banks and banking.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Ukrainian
Banking Law].
41. Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center (UEPLAC), Banking Law
Scoreboard Paper, (Sept. 2003).
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B. International Standards of Good Corporate Governance
The issue of corporate governance continues to attract considerable
attention in various national and international forums. In particular, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
issued a revised version of corporate governance principles in 2004.42
Recent events, such as the Enron and Parmalat scandals, and other noisy
failures, have put corporate governance on the front pages of major
newspapers.
At the same time, recent developments in corporate governance are
based on a firm foundation of more than a century of studies on this
issue by academics in both law and economics in the United States and
other Western countries. Obviously, without this fundamental
knowledge the whole idea of modern corporate governance would be
hard to understand. Current Ukrainian problems in this area stem from
large cultural hurdles and misunderstanding of corporate governance
issues not only by managers and directors, but also by legislators,
lawyers, shareholders, and the general public. Unfortunately,
Ukrainians will probably never grasp these ideas without the knowledge
of some fundamental concepts which form the cornerstones of modern
corporate governance practices. We will, therefore, proceed with a
discussion of the particular corporate governance problems in Ukrainian
bank legislation after an overview of some basic topics of corporate law,
a discussion of particular importance for effective corporate governance
in the case of banks.
1. What is "Corporate Governance?"
Although corporate governance is considered to be a relatively new
topic, corporate governance practices are well established. Governance
issues arise whenever an enterprise acquires a life of its own, i.e.,
whenever ownership of an entity is separated from its management. A
quick glance at Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations demonstrates that the
concept of corporate governance was understood as early as the
eighteenth century, even though the phrase was not in use. Smith states,
"the directors of companies, being managers of other people's money
42. See generally OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.
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than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own."''
The idea of corporate governance was further developed in the
Berle-Means (1932) paradigm of the separation of shareholders'
ownership and management's control in the corporation. 44 According to
the paradigm, agency problems arise when the principal (shareholders)
lacks the necessary power or information to monitor and control the
agent (managers). 4' There are three types of problems that shareholders
encounter when they seek to exercise their control over managers. First,
small shareholders frequently lack the expertise to monitor and assess
the work of managers who have a huge discretion over the flow of
information. Furthermore, large costs associated with monitoring
managers coupled with small investors who hold small stakes in a firm,
may induce a "free-rider" problem; that is, each investor relies on others
to undertake the costly process of monitoring managers, resulting in too
little monitoring. Additionally, given the difficulties of acquiring
information, the voting rights mechanism may not work effectively to
assuage the questionable practices of management. Second, large
shareholders may have a conflict of interest, which can undermine their
incentives to maximize firm value. For example, large shareholders may
enjoy private benefits of control that may inappropriately influence their
decision-making. Third, large shareholders may themselves be part of
organizations that face governance problems (such as Ukrainian
financial industrial groups).
As Chancellor Allen in Lewis v. Vogelstein points out, in the case of
shareholder ratification (as well as control) there is "no single individual
acting as principal, but rather a class or group of divergent individuals
- the class of shareholders. 46 The aggregate nature of the principal
means that: (1) "decisions to affirm or ratify an act will be subject to
collective action disabilities' 47 which occur when there are numerous
voters and no one voter expects his individual ballot to be pivotal to the
43. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
44. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks,
9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 91, 95 (2003).
45. Id. (citing ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (MacMillan 1932)).
46. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis added).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
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contest, and consequently such voters lack the incentive to study the
firm's affairs and vote intelligently; 48 (2) some portion of the body doing
the ratifying may in fact have conflicting interests; and (3) dissenting
class members may be able to "assert more or less convincingly that the
'will' of the principal is wrong, or even corrupt and ought not to be
binding on the class. In the case of individual ratification these issues
won't arise, assuming that the principal does not suffer from multiple
personality disorder.,
49
Several mechanisms work to reduce these principal-agent problems.
Shareholders can create a governance system that will mitigate manager
conflicts by providing for monitoring, creating incentive-based
compensation where pay is tied to the success of a corporation (such as
option-plans), and removing managers if they are inefficient.
Additionally, the risk of corporate control via a hostile takeover also
constrains management incentive to act contrary to the firm's interest. If
management is inefficient, the price of the company will go down,
thereby increasing the odds of a corporate takeover that could replace
the current officers with better management. Thus, corporate
governance mechanisms put managers' incentives on a par with those of
shareholders. They displace unfit and inefficient management and
penalize management teams that try to advance their own interests at
shareholders' expense.
50
2. Corporate Governance Models
The scholarly debate on corporate governance revolves around two
different models of corporate governance: the Anglo-American model
and the Franco-German model. The Anglo-American model takes the
"shareholder primacy theory" view, which focuses on maximizing
shareholder wealth. Shareholder priority is a deeply embedded (albeit
implicit) value in American corporate law rather than a legal rule in any
normal sense.5" As Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O'Hara observe,
48. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 402 (1983).
49. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997).
50. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 44, at 95-96.
51. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION § 9.1.1 (2003).
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"the issue of importance to corporate governance scholars [who follow
the Anglo-American model] begins with the assumption that corporate
governance should concern itself exclusively with the challenge of
protecting equity claimants, and attempts to specify ways in which the
corporation can better safeguard those interests. '52  According to the
shareholders primacy rule, in the case of conflicts between shareholder
wealth maximization and other company stakeholders and constituents
(employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and other groups),
the interests of the stakeholders and other constituents should be
ignored, unless management is legally permitted to take those other
interests into account.5 3 In contrast, the Franco-German approach to
corporate governance puts forth the belief that corporations should
protect the interests of all long-term stakeholders, at least to the same
extent it protects the interests of shareholders.5 4 The Anglo-American
model of corporate governance also differs from the Franco-German
model in its choice of preferred solutions to core problems of
governance. 5 Specifically, at the heart of the Anglo-American system
of corporate governance lies the idea of "market discipline," which
generally means private sector monitoring by investors. Conversely, the
central idea in the Franco-German governance model is the salutary role
of non-shareholder constituencies, particularly banks and employees.
While the differences between two models exist, there is also a common
ground on which they intersect. Both models maintain that good
corporate governance practices allow corporations to manage their
affairs effectively and increase their value.
3. What is a "Corporation?"
The dominant definition of the corporation in law and economics
52. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 44, at 91.
53. Id. Many states have so-called "other constituencies" statutes permitting
corporate boards' decision-making to take account of the interests of stakeholders, in
addition to shareholders' interests. Although Delaware does not have such a statute,
however, its case law gives boards the right to consider the effect of a hostile takeover
bid on non-shareholder constituencies when taking the decision to resist the takeover.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
54. See J. N. Ziegler, Corporate Governance and the Politics of Property Rights in
Germany, 28 POL. AND SOC'Y 195, 200 (2000).
55. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 44, at 91.
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stems from the original 1937 work by Ronald Coase, The Nature of the
Firm.56 In his work, Coase suggested that firms exist because it is more
efficient to organize complex tasks within a hierarchical organization
with established authority and compensation structures, than through the
market and a series of individualized contracts. Coase's successor,
Professor Oliver Williamson, described the corporation as a set of
transactions and cost-reducing relationships or, in Williamson's
terminology, "governance structures. 57  Under this approach, the
corporation is a complex web or "nexus" of contractual relationships
among the various claimants to the cash flows of the enterprise.58 The
above-mentioned claimants of the "nexus of contracts" include not only
corporate shareholders, but also creditors, employee-managers, local
communities, suppliers, customers, and, as in the case of banks,
regulators acting as protectors of depositors and lenders of last resort.
Under the "nexus of contracts" approach there is not necessarily a
presumption of preference for one class of claimants over another.
Instead, each claimant or group of claimants deserves to receive the
exact benefits of the particular bargain with the firm. Thus, issues of
corporate governance could be re-characterized as problems of
incomplete contracts.
Because the parties cannot anticipate every contingency,
contractual arrangements of any complexity necessarily will be
incomplete.5 9 It follows that if parties were to rely only on these
incomplete contracts there would be unbearably high monitoring costs
on both sides. Rules of corporate governance, therefore, are aimed at
resolving gaps left in these contractual arrangements in ways consistent
with maximizing the value of the firm. In the United States, these gap
filling rules are called "fiduciary duties."
56. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA no. 386 (1937),
reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
57. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTES OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (First Free Press Books 1985).
58. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416,1426 (1989).
59. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations andAgency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 291 (1986).
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4. Fiduciary Duties
Fiduciary duties serve as implicit standard terms in all contractual
agreements that lower the cost of contracting.6 ° Properly interpreted,
fiduciary duties should meet the bargain the parties themselves would
have reached had they been able to negotiate at a low cost. 61 Therefore,
in their gap-filling role, fiduciary duties require the agents of the
corporation (i.e. directors) to promote the interests of corporate
stakeholders above their own. Thus, fiduciary duties are imposed on
members of the board of directors of a firm who are ultimately
responsible for managing and supervising the business and affairs of the
corporation.62  If fiduciary duties are breached, directors of the
corporation may be held personally liable for the damages. There are
two duties created by the fiduciary duty of board members: the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty.
Under the duty of loyalty, directors must fully disclose their
conflicts of interest and must not use their position for personal gain at
the expense of the corporation (including fraudulent conduct and
inappropriate self-dealing). The duty of care requires directors to act as
a "reasonable prudent person" would act in the same circumstances and
take corporate decisions on an informed basis. 63 The duty of care also
imposes an ongoing responsibility on directors to monitor a firm's
compliance with the law as well as the corporation's performance.6 4 In
making corporate decisions, directors are entitled to rely on information
provided by the company's officers as well as outside consultants.
However, this ability does not release directors from their responsibility
of making independent business decisions; directors are only "entitled to
good faith, not blind reliance" on experts.65
The "fiduciary duties" are not only a common law system concept,
but also an international standard. For example, under German law,
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del.
1989) (holding that "directors owe fiduciary duties . . . to the corporation and its
shareholders").
63. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (stating that "a
director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of
care").
64. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
65. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
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directors must apply the same degree of care as is normally applied by
persons in responsible positions of authority who manage the finances of
other persons.66 According to the German Corporate Governance Code
"[a]ll members of the supervisory board are bound by the enterprise's
best interests; [n]o member of the supervisory board may pursue
personal interests in his/her decisions or use business opportunities
intended for the enterprise for himself/herself., 67  French legislation
requires corporate directors to act as "bons pares de familles" ("good
parents of families").68 Under the French Commercial Code, directors
must refrain from taking any action contrary to the company's best
interests, and must not promote their own personal interests when acting
in the company's name.69  And finally, the OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance set forth the fiduciary duties of the board of
directors, stating that "board members should act on a fully informed
basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest
of the company and the shareholders."70
5. Business Judgment Rule
In applying duty of care standards there is, however, the danger that
courts may second-guess good-faith decisions made by "honest but
mistaken" directors.7" This danger "could induce a board to avoid
authorizing risky investment projects to any extent," which is not in the
shareholders best interest.7 2 To settle this problem, over roughly the past
150 years, U.S. courts have developed the so-called "business judgment
rule., 73  That rule, in effect, provides that where a director is
66. See The German Stock Corporation Act §93.
67. German Corporate Governance Code § 5.5.1, available at
http://www.corporate-govemance-code.de/eng/download/ECorGovEndfassung2005-
markiert.pdf.
68. See French Commercial Code, available at http://195.83.177.9/code/
index.phtml?lang=uk.
69. See generally French Commercial Code, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codestraduits/commercetextA.htm#Sub-
section%202:%2oManagement%20and%20supervisory%20boards.
70. See OECD, supra note 42, at Principle VI(A).
71. Gagliardi v.Trifolds Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996).
72. Id. at 1052.
73. See generally S. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, in
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independent and disinterested, there can be no liability for corporate
loss, "unless the facts are such that no person could possibly authorize
such a transaction... attempting in good faith to meet their [fiduciary]
duty."74 Absent fraud, illegality, or a conflict of interest, the "business
judgment" of a majority of the directors "will not be disturbed if they
can be attributed to any rational business purpose."75 When the business
judgment rule applies, the plaintiff carries the burden of rebutting the
presumption in favor of sound business judgments by showing that the
directors were not sufficiently well informed, the directors could not
rationally believe that the decision was in the best interest of the
shareholders, or the decision was not made in good faith. Accordingly,
the business judgment rule substantially reduces the risk that directors
will be held liable for simple mistakes of judgment.
At the same time, the "business judgment rule" has very limited
applicability in bank supervision cases. In reviewing these cases,
"courts must defer to the banking agencies' determinations" on whether
actions or inactivity of bank directors were consistent with the "safe and
sound" operating of a bank.76 Under the enforcement provisions of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, bank directors or officers may be
removed from office or prohibited any further participation in the
conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution if they
"committed or engaged in any act, omission, or practice which
constitutes a breach of [their] fiduciary duty., 77  Furthermore, a
substantial civil monetary penalty may be imposed on a director or
officer if a breach of fiduciary duty: (1) was a part of a pattern of
misconduct; (2) caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal loss to
such depository institution; or (3) resulted in pecuniary gain or other
benefit to such party.78  In addition, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA) explicitly incorporates a corporate governance perspective by
requiring that a depository institution be "well managed" as a condition
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BusrNEss ORGANIZATION, 242 (William T.
Allen & Reinier Kraakman eds., 2003).
74. See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1053.
75. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
76. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank
Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
175, 175 (1995).
77. 12 U.S.C. §1818 (e)(1)(A)(iii).
78. 12 U.S.C. §1818 (i)(2)(b)(ii).
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for engaging in expanded activities.7 9
C. Stricter Standards for Banks
1. Significance of Banks
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter "Basel
Committee") in 2005 issued a new edition of its guide on corporate
governance in banks published in 1999.80 The purpose of the document
is to assist banks and their supervisors in the implementation and
enforcement of sound corporate governance, and to offer practical
guidance that is relevant to the "unique characteristics facing banking
organizations.""1
What are the characteristics of banks that make them unique? First,
they are depository institutions and, much more than any other
institutions, operate with "other people's money. 8 2  Therefore, bank
directors are charged with a special public trust to safeguard depositors'
wealth, and must act in a way that promotes "confidence" to the public. 3
Second, banks play a significant role in affecting the money supply and
exercising a liquidity production function. By holding illiquid assets
and issuing liquid liabilities, banks create liquidity for the economy. 4
Third, banks play a crucial role in the flow of capital within an
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (j)(4)(B)(i).
80. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Corporate
Governance for Banking Organisations (July 2005), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs117.pdf, see also Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations (Sept.
1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc138.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Although it is not uncommon for typical manufacturing firms to finance
themselves with more debt than equity, banks typically receive ninety percent or more
of their funding from debt.
83. See Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, speaking at the Second Islamic Financial Services
Board (IFSB) Summit 2005: The Rise and Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in
the Islamic Financial Services Industry, Basel II and Corporate Governance Issues
(May 24, 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r050525a.pdf.
84. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,
and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. EcoN. 401, 403 (1983).
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economy. They are the principal providers of capital in many parts of
the world. Finally, they comprise the country's payment system. Thus,
the business of banking has a number of intrinsic risks that may
jeopardize the entire financial system of an economy: (a) high debt-to-
equity ratios, which can make banks vulnerable to losses; (b) a possible
mismatch in maturities between assets and liabilities;5 (c) dependence
on the confidence of depositors and the financial markets for securing
necessary funds; and (d) the general opaqueness of the business of
banking.8
6
To put it simply, the success or failure of banks has more
significant external consequences than the success or failure of most
other types of firms, particularly in an economy with a bank-centered
financial system. Therefore, a stable and healthy banking system is
critical to the long-term growth of the economy.
2. "Moral Hazard"
The "mismatch between deposits and liabilities becomes a problem
in the unusual situation of a bank run. Bank runs are essentially a
collective-action problem among depositors. 87 If, for any reason, large,
unanticipated withdrawals begin at a bank, depositors as individuals may
rationally conclude that they must do the same to avoid being left with
nothing. This is exactly what happened during the "Orange
Revolution," when imprudent statements by former political leaders
combined with an unstable political system spurred public belief of the
banking system's instability, which in turn led to liquidity problems for
most Ukrainian banks. Government safety nets, such as deposit
insurance funds, are often justified on the grounds that they solve the
problem of bank runs by eliminating the incentive for any single
85. Newly developed secondary markets have mitigated to some extent the
mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities.
86. See Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion
of Concepts and Evidence 8 (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 3404, Sept.
2004), available at http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/
IW3P/IB/2004/10/08/000012009_20041008124126/Rendered/PDFIWPS3404.pdf
(stating that "informational asymmetries between insiders and outsiders in banking
make it very difficult for diffuse equity and debt holders to monitor bank managers").
87. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 44, at 97.
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depositor to rush to demand repayment of his deposits." Despite the
positive effect of deposit insurance on preventing bank runs, the
implementation of deposit insurance creates a cost of its own - it gives
the shareholders and managers of insured banks89 incentives to engage in
excessive risk-taking. This effect in financial literature is whimsically
called "moral hazard." 90 "Moral hazard" is particularly important in
Ukraine, which has a deposit insurance program.
The transfer of risk affects behavior incentives: if bank shareholders
can impose their losses onto the insurance funds, they no longer have an
incentive to take precautions to avoid the harm. One is tempted to argue
that the party insured here is the depositor, not the bank, and if a bank
engages in exceedingly risky behavior it may go broke and shareholders
will suffer loss. However, in situations where a corporation is at or near
insolvency, shareholders have a strong incentive to increase risk because
their losses are limited to the amount of their investment, while gains
that might result from the risky behavior could be disproportionately
high. This problem is heightened in the banking context because of the
high debt-to-equity ratio.
Companies outside the banking industry that are close to insolvency
also have an incentive to take added risks. However, non-financial firms
that are in financial distress usually have significant liquidity problems.
In the case of banks, the situation is different; they can continue to
attract liquidity in the form of deposits protected by government
insurance. Moreover, in a system in which creditors are protected
against borrower default insolvency, the risk is shifted away from
depositors. Accordingly, the depositors have little incentive to monitor a
bank's risk-taking behavior.9 Deposit insurance eliminates the market
forces that starve non-financial firms of cash. Depositors of insured
financial institutions cannot be expected to exert the proper degree of
restraint on banks. This enhances the influence exerted by shareholders,
whose preference is to assume high risk levels. Moral hazard not only
creates a problem of excessive risk-taking by banks, but also leads to a
88. Id.
89. Id. Federal deposit insurance technically insures the depositor, not the bank,
even though we speak of "FDIC-insured banks."
90. See MACEY, MILLER & CARNELL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 247 (3d ed.,
Aspen 2001).
91. See id. at 248.
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reduction in the normal levels of internal monitoring of the firm's
business, "resulting in a higher incidence of bank failures due to fraud"
and other duty of loyalty violations, such as self-dealing.92
3. Importance of Corporate Governance in Banks for Bank Supervision
Corporate governance aims to protect the interests of depositors by
minimizing the flow of inconsistent information between a bank's
managers, its owners and its customers. Corporate governance is
normally administered and monitored by bank supervisors within an
institution. Banks are held to a higher standard of prudent behavior as
compared to other sectors because of the adverse incentives for high
risk-taking caused by deposit insurance, a high debt-to-equity ratio, and
other specific features of the banking industry. Exceptionally prudent
behavior is effectuated through the implementation of strict
accountability requirements within a banking institution in many
countries including the Ukraine. It is therefore crucial that banks have
strong corporate governance policies, especially in the Ukraine where
there is not a developed securities market yet in place and banks serve as
the principal intermediaries between savers and borrowers.
Sound corporate governance is key to creating an effective banking
supervision system. Consequently, bank supervisors have a strong
interest in ensuring that there is effective corporate governance at every
banking organization. A fundamental understanding of bank
supervision is a necessity for having the appropriate levels of
accountability and a system of maintaining checks and balances within a
banking institution. Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board affirms this important notion, stating, "[w]e need
to adopt policies that promote private counterparty supervision as the
first line of defense for a safe and sound banking system." 93 Simply put,
sound corporate governance makes the important work of bank
supervisors infinitely easier. Consequently, confidence in the corporate
governance processes at the bank may enhance the supervisor's overall
92. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 44, at 98.
93. See Jonathan Charkham, Guidance for the Directors of Banks, at v, (World
Bank 2003) available at http://www.gcgf.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
Focus_2_Guidance forDirectors/$FILE/Focus2Guidance forDirectors of Banks.
pdf.
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confidence that the bank is being operated prudently,94 which may be
reflected in the intensity of supervision applied. Thus, good corporate
governance and supervisory actions complement one another.
D. Ukraine Banking System
The evolution of the national banking system in Ukraine may be
traced back to March 1991, following the adoption of the Law of
Ukraine "On Banks and Banking" by the Ukrainian Parliament.95 The
Ukrainian banking system is a two-tiered structure consisting of the
National Bank of Ukraine and commercial banks characterized by
various types and forms of ownership.96 The National Bank of Ukraine
serves as both the country's central bank and bank regulator. The range
of commercial banks' activities includes all traditional banking
activities, as well as investments in securities.97 Commercial banks
serve an important role in this respect because in Ukraine, where
alternative sources of capital, such as corporate bond offerings or
developed equity markets, are in the infancy stages of development,
banks are the principal providers of capital.
1. Banking Sector Growth
The Ukrainian banking sector has experienced rapid growth in
recent years. According to the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), net
wealth (total assets not including formed reserves) of the Ukrainian
banking system increased in 2005 by 59.2% to almost Hyrvnia (UAH)
214 billion ($42.8 billion), which is equivalent to 60% of the country's
GDP.9 s Nevertheless, even with this impressive banking industry
growth, the banking sector continues to operate far below its potential,
especially in comparison to its European neighbors. For instance, in
94. See id. at 8 (noting the bank supervisor's interest in ensuring strong corporate
governance is in place).
95. National Bank of Ukraine, Structure of the Banking System of Ukraine,
http://www.bank.gov.ua/ENGL/ Bsyst/index.htm.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. UNIAN Informational Agency, http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-
95156.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2006). Hyrvnia, or UAH, is the Ukrainian currency.
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2003, the ratio of total banking assets to GDP in Ukraine was only 40%,
which was 1% lower than the asset ratio in Russia, 32% lower than
Hungary, 27% lower than Poland, three times lower than the Czech
Republic, and seven times lower than that of the Euro-zone. A
comparative analysis of the total balance ratio between Ukraine and
other European countries also reveals huge disparities. The ratio of total
balance capital of Ukrainian commercial banks to GDP was 5%,
whereas in Russia this ratio was 6%, the Czech Republic 7%, in
Hungary and Poland 8%, and in Euro-zone countries 120%.
Banking System of Ukraine in Comparison to Russia, Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Euro Zone
Ukraine iungary olandCzech Euro
_ _ep. one
GDP per person US 1037 3100 5150 4600 5500 26000
Total number of 179 37 219
banking institutions
Total number ol 1430 3219 1125 10509 1751 179360
branches
Total number of 9 6 4 24
banks per 1 million
of population
Participation of 11 66 69 94
foreigners in the
capital of banks
Share of 5 biggest 38 43 60 70 66 55
banks by the amount
of assets, %
Assets of banking 40 [72 67 121 280
system, % GDP
[Credits to private 26 118
sector, % GDP
lCapital of banking 2
system, % GDP
Profits of bankin .3 8 7
system, % GDP [Jf_ __
2006] BANK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 875
THE EMERGING UKRAINIAN MARKET
Average amount o0.9 . 8.1 17.8 13.6
rofits per 1 bank,
millions of US $
Amount of deposits / 127 15 70 240 45 7500
)opulation, US $
,Amount of deposits / 207
able-bodied
population, US $
According to the NBU data available as of February 1, 2006, there
were 164 licensed banks.99 The National Bank of Ukraine has divided
the Ukrainian commercial banks into four groups according to their
performance data. The top twelve banks with more than UAH 3.9
billion ($780 million) of assets were classified in the first group. The
second group (15 banks) consists of banks with total assets of UAH 1.8-
3.9 billion ($360-780 million), the third group (29 banks) has banks with
UAH 0.5-1.8 billion ($120-240 million) in assets, and the fourth group
has banks with less than UAH 0.5 billion ($100 million) of assets."'
More than 100 banks are included in the fourth category of banks,
including almost 80 banks (half of all Ukrainian banks), which have less
than UAH 0.3 billion ($60 million) of assets, and around 40 have less
than UAH 150 million ($30 million).' 0 '
2. Concentration
Despite the large number of banks, a high, albeit declining,
proportion of the banking sector's assets and bank transactions are
concentrated in the hands of the largest Ukrainian banks. This
concentration has noticeable effects on the economy. The banks in the
first and second groups of the NBU classification accumulated 71.6% of
the total assets of all commercial banks. 10 2 Moreover it is significant
99. National Bank of Ukraine, http://www.bank.gov.ua/ENGL/Banksupervision/
Results/2006/01.02.2006e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
100. See National Bank of Ukraine, Resolution No. 291 from Dec. 30, 2005, On
Division of Banks into Groups, available at http://www.ufs.kiev.ua/stories/
showlaw.php?id=405 (last visited May 9, 2006).
101. See id.
102. Ihor Vlasyuk, Own Tomatoes are Closer. How Many Banks Does Ukraine
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that the top ten banks account for 54-55% of total assets, credit
portfolios, and liabilities. This allows these banks to earn almost three-
fourths of all investments in securities, two-fifths of total balance capital
and one-fourth of the authorized capital. 10 3 They have attracted more
than half of the total funds of economic agents and 2/3 of the deposits of
people.1 04 Their earnings make up 56% of the total income of Ukrainian
banks and 46% of net earnings.'0 5 The top five banks account for 37-
39% of the total assets of all Ukrainian commercial banks.10 6  A
microanalysis of the banks also illustrates the huge market share of a
few banking institutions. For example, Privatbank, a "private-sector
bank based in Dnepropetrovsk, in southeast Ukraine, now has the largest
market share (15%) of retail deposits, ahead of Oschadny Bank, the
former state savings bank of the USSR.' 10 7 Oschadny is the only bank
in Ukraine to benefit from a full-scale state guarantee of retail
deposits.10 8 "This is very different than the situation in Russia, where
the state-owned Sberbank (the former savings bank of the USSR, also
with a state guarantee on retail deposits), retains a dominant position in
the retail banking market" (65% market share of retail deposits).'0 9
Ten Largest Ukrainian Banks by Total Assets and Equity at 1 January
2006" 0
UAH million. (UAH 1 is approximately equal to $0.2)
[Assets quity Liabilities
1. Privatbank 21 664.3551 266.9890i 1119397.36614
2. Aval ]119 258.7423,]1 745.5455, 17 513.1968 t
3. Ukrsotsba 110 762.9632 .l11 027.1737, 9735.7895 .
UkrSibbank 10 669.19051 947.7483 t 721.44221
Need and Where They Can Find so Much Capital?, ZERKALO NEDELI, Feb. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.zn.kiev.ua/nn/show/583/52510/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Fitch Country Report, supra note 1, at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Finance.ua, Bank's Financial Results Asset & Liabilities, available at
http://tables.finance.ua/en/finres/-/l/2006/01/01/2/0 (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
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5. Ukreximbank 10376.11411 1067.15511 308.95901
6. Oschadny Bank 9 515.3150- [775.57941. 18 739.7356 t
kRaine 7 048.9884 t 1626.5132t 6 422.4752 1,Ukraine
[8. Nadra Bank 15 922.4967 't 1551.3246. ]t5371.1721 i,
9. Brokbusinessbank 768.8315 -r 1606.1612t [4 162.6703 1-
1. Finansy TaIL
dit 142 1.7 5 88.6704 t 933.0410i
3. Ownership Structure of Commercial Banks
Commercial banks are formed as stock companies, limited liability
companies or cooperative banks with both legal and natural persons as
their owners."' In Ukraine there are 132 commercial banks formed as
stock companies (forty-one of them as closed stock companies), and
thirty-two commercial banks that were set up as limited liability
companies." 2  Twenty of these banks are funded by some foreign
investment (seven banks are funded completely by foreign capital). 13
Ukrainian banks usually constitute a part of larger business groups
with highly complex structures, which makes the effective supervision
of banks more difficult.' '4  The legal and managerial structures of
Ukrainian groups differ; some groups have adopted a management style
where staff members report on particular aspects of their work to a range
of directors or senior managers based in other group companies.' In
the worst case scenario, controlling persons of banking groups
deliberately choose a complex structure, purposely concealing the bank
in the middle of a conglomerate in order to obscure its operations or true
ownership, and thereby avoid supervision of their activities. 16
111. See Ukrainian Banking Law, supra note 40, at arts. 6, 14.
112. National Bank of Ukraine, http://www.bank.gov.ua/ENGL/Bank-supervision/
Results/2006/01.02.2006e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Fitch Country Report, supra note 1, at 2; IFC, supra note 4, at 7;
Shkurupiy, supra note 9, at 11, 12.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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4. Deposit Insurance
In 1999, a separate deposit insurance fund ("Fund for the Guarantee
of Deposits of Natural Persons") was set up by the government to
provide deposit insurance for commercial banks.'17 Participation in the
fund is mandatory for banks that are licensed to accept deposits. Banks
contribute to the fund with an up-front payment of 1% of their statutory
capital, followed by a payment of 0.25% of average retail deposits on a
semiannual basis. 18 The sum of individual deposits covered by this
scheme was set forth at a level not less then UAH 1200 ($240), which
the Fund may increase from time to time." 9 Currently deposits are
guaranteed for up to UAH 8,000 ($1,600).120
III. BANK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE
Recently, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) completed a
Survey of Corporate Governance Practices in the Ukrainian Banking
Sector (the "Survey"). 12 ' The Survey summarizes certain key issues in
the corporate governance of banks in Ukraine. As the Survey points out:
Overall, the surveyed banks are in compliance with legal and
regulatory requirements with regard to governing bodies, and most
banks are in the process of improving their Supervisory Board and
Management Board practices. Most Management Boards are staffed
by qualified and experienced professionals, capable of both
providing strategic guidance, and managing day-to-day operations.
A significant proportion of the banks, however, do not yet fully
understand the specific roles and functions of the Supervisory Board
and the Management Board. In many banks there is no clear
division of functions between the various governing bodies - either
the Supervisory Board and the General Shareholders' Meeting have
overlapping and interchangeable responsibilities, or the Supervisory
Board is actively involved in controlling day-to-day operations
117. See generally The Law of Ukraine on Banks and Banking, No. 2740-1I1 (2001),
available at http://www.ukremb.com/business/docs/law-on-banks-andbanking.pdf.
118. Id. at arts. 22, 23.
119. Id. at art. 3.
120. The Fund for Guaranteeing Deposits of Natural Persons, available at
http://www.fg.org.ua/koninf.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
121. See generally IFC, supra note 4.
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alongside with the Management Board.
Most [Ukrainian] banks have relatively concentrated ownership with
Boards consisting of (or representing) major shareholders. The
meetings of the Supervisory Boards thus become almost identical to
a General Meeting of Shareholders and roles get confused.... [It is
common that certain large] shareholders directly appoint members to
the Supervisory and Management Boards.
It is exactly this lack of clarity in the separation and formalization of
duties and responsibilities that is the reason for other shortcomings
and deficiencies in board practices of Ukrainian banks - inadequate
board structures, weak composition and balance of membership, lack
of Supervisory Board committees and independent directors, poor
working methods, accountability, performance appraisal and
remuneration.
The Ukrainian banking system is. .. characterized by an intricately
spun network of interests as well as economic and political
relationships among major shareholder groups. Outsiders find it
difficult to decipher this web of dependencies and to identify the real
driving force behind a bank's strategy and business decisions.
Transparency and the separation of ownership and management,
crucial for generating trust and achieving an appropriate balance of
accountability between the governing bodies of a corporation, have
thus been regularly cited as a key corporate governance concern for
the Ukrainian banking sector.
1 22
Therefore, symptoms of current corporate governance problems in
Ukrainian banks can be described simply as unclear lines of
responsibility of corporate governance bodies, weak supervisory boards,
and overdependence on their major shareholders. These problems are
caused by ambiguous and inconsistent Ukrainian banking legislation.
Currently the main deficiencies of Ukrainian bank corporate
governance legislation are:
1. Excessive shareholder authority;
2. Unclear structure and responsibilities of the bank governance
bodies such as the supervisory board, management board, and revision
commission;
3. Lack of supervisory board committees; and
122. See IFC, supra note 4, at 7, 12, 30, 42.
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4. Absence of requirements for the internal structure of supervisory
boards.
A. Role of Shareholders
1. Current Problems
The Ukrainian Banking Law refers to the general shareholders'
meeting as the "management body" of a bank. 1 3 Under the Banking
Law, the general shareholders' meeting shall exclusively have authority
on the following matters:
(1) outline of the basic trends of bank activity and approval of
reports on implementation thereof [i.e. bank strategy]; (2)
introduction of changes and amendments to the bank charter; (3)
change of size of bank authorized capital; (4) appointments and
dismissal of the Chairmen and members of the bank Supervisory
Board and Revision Commission; (5) approval of annual reports of
bank activity including its subsidiaries, approval of reports and
conclusions of the auditing commission and independent auditors;
(6) profit distribution; and (7) termination of bank activity,
appointment of a liquidator, approval of the liquidation balance
sheet. 1
24
According to Article 40 of the Banking Law, the management
board acts on behalf of the bank and reports to the general meeting of
shareholders and the supervisory board of the bank. The management
board acts on the basis of a policy approved by the general meeting of
shareholders or by the supervisory board of the bank. 25
Moreover, the Ukrainian Banking Association (a powerful banking
lobby in Ukraine) advocates that legislators should reinstate a provision
of the Banking Law that was in effect until 2000, which gave final
authority for hiring and replacing the management board to
shareholders. 26 The Association argues that management boards should
be protected from arbitrary dismissal by supervisory boards through a
123. Ukrainian Banking Law, supra note 40, at arts. 37, 38.
124. Id. at art. 38.
125. Id. at art. 40.
126. See Association of Ukrainian Banks, http://www.aub.com.ua/en/.
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shareholder approval procedure.
12 17
2. International Norms
While the theory of direct shareholder control is understandable, it
is not appropriate for banks. First, banking is a highly specialized
business. Dispersed shareholders lack the necessary knowledge in
specific issues such as the bank mission and strategy, distribution of
profits, and the appointment of key executives. It is important that a
body, such as the supervisory board, whose members are chosen based
on their business reputation and experience, defines such issues.
Second, it is not practical for the entire shareholders' meeting to
evaluate strategic initiatives, and ultimately select candidates for senior
management positions. It is much more efficient to place these
functions in the hands of a smaller body, such as the supervisory board,
which is elected to represent the shareholders and will normally be
comprised of persons with business expertise who can properly define
bank strategy and evaluate the suitability of prospective senior
management officials. Third, if changes in the market environment (or a
vacancy on a management board) occur between annual shareholders'
meetings, a special shareholder meeting would need to be convened to
approve respective amendments or appointments. It may be difficult to
convene special meetings in sufficient time to allow the supervisory or
management board to respond to pressing business matters. Finally, as
the IFC Survey notes, in some Ukrainian banks where large shareholders
directly appoint members of the management board and define corporate
strategy, the shareholders' authority has led to misplaced loyalties and
blurred lines of accountability. 128 Management board members have
given priority to the interests of this large shareholders' group rather
than to their responsibilities to the bank as a whole.
129
Moreover, as we have seen in the discussion of corporate
governance fundamentals, direct control by shareholders does not
adequately protect the rights of all shareholders and may not enforce
minority shareholders' and other constituencies' rights. In international
127. Id.
128. See IFC, supra note 4, at 29.
129. Id.
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practice, therefore, corporate governance arrangements, almost without
exception, limit direct shareholder involvement. In some cases,
particularly in the United States, this is facilitated by dispersed
ownership, which limits direct shareholder involvement to at most
periodic interference via proxy fights, hostile takeovers, or other
mechanisms that seek to mobilize shareholders. Although in the
European Union concentrated ownership is the norm, such centralized
ownership does not translate into greater shareholder control. In a two-
tier Franco-German corporate governance system, supervisory boards of
non-executive directors operate semi-independently from shareholders
and effectively shield management from direct shareholder
involvement. 30 Moreover, in some countries (e.g. Germany) cross-
holdings and pyramid structures may shield firms from shareholders.'
As the Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance point out:
Equity investors have certain property rights. For example, an equity
share in a publicly traded company can be bought, sold, or
transferred. An equity share also entitles the investor to participate
in the profits of the corporation, with liability limited to the amount
of the investment. In addition, ownership of an equity share
provides a right to information about the corporation and a right to
influence the corporation, primarily by participation in general
shareholder meetings and by voting.
As a practical matter, however, the corporation cannot be managed
by shareholder referendum. The shareholding body is made up of
individuals and institutions whose interests, goals, investment
horizons and capabilities vary. Moreover, the corporation's
management must be able to take business decisions rapidly. In light
of these realities and the complexity of managing the corporation's
affairs in fast moving and ever changing markets, shareholders are
not expected to assume responsibility for managing corporate
activities. The responsibility for corporate strategy and operations is
typically placed in the hands of the board and a management team
that is selected, motivated and, when necessary, replaced by the
board. 1
32
130. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANcIAL SYSTEMS
(MIT Press 2000).
131. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 44, at 96.
132. See OECD, supra note 42, at 32.
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Therefore, the responsibility for the corporate strategy and
operations of banks should be in the hands of a properly established
supervisory board, and a management team that is selected, motivated
and replaced by that board.
B. Responsibilities of Bank Governance Bodies
1. Current Problems
Ukrainian Banking Law prescribes a two-tier board structure with a
supervisory board and a management board (board of directors) 33 with
mutually exclusive membership. This formal division of functions is
especially welcome in the Ukrainian banking context where very often
the same person/industrial group is simultaneously a major shareholder,
a director, and/or a manager. 34 Although it is prescribed in the Banking
Law, the law does not clearly define the formal division of bank
governance bodies' functions.
Under Article 37 of the Banking Law, bank management bodies
comprise the general participants' (shareholders) meeting, the
supervisory board, and the management board (board of directors) of the
bank.'3 5 The supervisory board of the bank is elected at the general
shareholders' meeting from among bank participants (shareholders) or
their representatives. 3 6 Members of the bank supervisory board cannot
be members of the management board or the bank's revision
commission. 137  The supervisory board of the bank performs the
following functions: (1) appoints and dismisses the chairman and
members of the bank's management board; (2) controls the activity of
the bank's management board; (3) appoints an external auditor; (4) sets
133. The Ukrainian Banking Law creates a certain amount of confusion in referring
to full-time senior managers as a "board of directors," - the body that in many
countries is elected by the shareholders to represent them and to oversee the
implementation of approved policies by the full-time senior managers. The Ukrainian
Banking Law in describing such a representative body uses the term "supervisory
board."
134. See IFC, supra note 4, at 29.
135. Ukrainian Banking Law, supra note 40, at art. 37.
136. Id. at art. 39.
137. Id.
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forth a procedure for revision and control over the bank's financial and
economic activity; (5) makes decisions on covering losses; (6) makes
decisions on the establishment, reorganization and liquidation of the
bank's subsidiaries, branches, and representative offices, and approves
their statutes and regulations; (7) approves the terms of compensation
and incentives for management board members; (8) prepares proposals
on issues to be considered at the general shareholders' meeting; and (9)
exercises other authorities, delegated by the general shareholders'
meeting.
38
Article 37 also refers to the revision commission and internal audit
as controlling bodies of the bank. 9 The Banking Law requires the
supervisory board to "set forth the procedure for review and control over
financial and economic activity of the bank,"' 40  while the revision
commission "exercises control over" these financial and business
activities.14 1  This arrangement would be understandable if the
commission were a committee of the supervisory board, acting on its
behalf and reporting to it. Under the Banking Law, however, the
commission is appointed by, and reports to, the general meeting of the
shareholders. 42 Thus, the law establishes two governance bodies that
are responsible to the shareholders for the bank's financial and economic
activity. Moreover, the Banking Law assigns responsibility for
controlling the bank's adherence to the legal and regulatory
requirements to internal audit, a body under the ongoing control of the
supervisory board. 43 There is no mention in the law of the board's role
in either defining a bank's corporate strategy, or operating the bank. It
is thus not clear who - the supervisory board or the revision
commission - is ultimately responsible for ensuring the overall safety
and soundness of the bank.
The Banking Law provisions do not clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of a supervisory board. Due to the law's ambiguity,
Ukrainian banks struggle to define the supervisory board's proper
functional role. In some banks, supervisory boards do not actively shape
138. Id.
139. Id. at art. 37.
140. Id. at art. 39 2(4).
141. Id. at art. 41.
142. Id.
143. Id. at art. 45 2(2).
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the bank's strategy, or exist only for compliance purposes.144 In some
cases, boards do not act as collective decision-making bodies; often
board members do not fully understand their role and their authority in
performing oversight and fiduciary duties to the bank and its
shareholders as a whole. 145 Many Ukrainian bankers associate a seat on
the supervisory board more with prestige rather than with responsibility
and active stewardship.
46
2. International Norms
According to the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance,
the [supervisory] board should fulfill certain key functions,
including: reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of
action, risk policy, annual budgets, and business plans; overseeing
major capital expenditures, acquisitions, and divestitures; ensuring
the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting
systems, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and
operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant
standards. 
147
The Basel Committee views the supervisory board as the body that
establishes the strategic objectives and ethical standards that will direct
the ongoing activities of the bank, taking into account the interests of
stakeholders.148 The board should take the lead in establishing the "tone
at the top" by approving ethical standards and corporate values for itself,
senior management and other employees.149 The board should ensure
that senior management implements policies to (1) identify, (2) prevent
or appropriately manage, and (3) appropriately disclose potential
conflicts of interest which may arise as a result of the bank's various
activities and roles (e.g. as a lender, provider of investment and ancillary
services, and proprietary trader). 50  Moreover, supervisory boards
144. See IFC, supra note 4, at 12.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Id. at 30.
147. See OECD, supra note 42, at Principle VI(D)(1), (7).
148. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (July 2005), supra note 80, at
16.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 18.
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should clearly define the authorities and key responsibilities for
themselves, as well as for senior management. 
151
The framework of the New Capital Accord (Basel 11)152 reinforces
the role of the supervisory board by stressing the importance of its
ability to assess the bank's risks, and to ensure that capital levels
adequately reflect such risk. Pillar 2 of the Basel II Framework requires
a bank's board to ensure that a sound system of oversight and control is
in place and that risk management procedures are appropriate in relation
to the institution's risk profile.'53 The supervisory board also needs to
ensure adequate disclosure of key information under Pillar 3 so that
market discipline becomes an integral part of the control framework for
senior management. 
15 4
Therefore, under this guidance, a supervisory board should be
clearly defined as a body that is ultimately accountable for ensuring that
that the bank adheres to legal requirements, and that the bank is operated
in a safe and sound manner.
C. Audit Committee
1. Current Problems
As was previously mentioned, the current Banking Law requires
that each bank have a "revision commission," which is responsible for
controlling the bank's financial and economic activity.' 55 The revision
commission has the following powers: (1) to control the bank's
adherence to Ukrainian legislation and NBU regulations; (2) to review
reports of internal and external auditors and prepare respective proposals
for the general shareholders' meeting; (3) to submit proposals to the
general shareholders' meeting or the bank's supervisory board on any
issues within the authority of the revision commission, which concern
financial safety and stability and protection of the interests of bank
151. Idat 23.
152. See generally Basel Committee for Bank Supervision, Basel II. International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework
(June 2004) (updated Nov. 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Ukrainian Banking Law, supra note 40, at art. 41.
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clients. 15 6  The revision commission consists of bank participants
(shareholders) or their representatives elected by and accountable to
shareholders. 5 7 Members of the revision commission may not be bank
employees. 5 8 Shareholders do not have the right to approve the bank's
financial statements without first consulting the revision commission.5 9
2. International Norms
In light of the board structure discussion, 60 such provisions are
very problematic. In modem corporate governance practice, the
supervisory board controls the financial and business activities of an
enterprise (including banks) and ensures appropriate risk management,
internal controls, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
All of this is not done by a separate body elected by the shareholders.
At the same time in virtually every Western, market-oriented country,
the review of a bank's annual statement and evaluation of appropriate
internal control procedures is exercised by the audit committee, which is
a specialized committee of the board of directors (supervisory board)
that assists the board with its oversight functions.
In some cases, audit committees are legally required. For example,
under U.S. law, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires that each
insured depository institution has an independent audit committee
entirely made up of outside directors who are independent of the
management of the institution, and who satisfy any specific
requirements the Corporation establishes.' 6' U.S. law requires that an
independent audit committee review, with management and the
independent public accountants, the basis for the firm's annual reports
on: management responsibility for financial statements and internal
controls, internal control evaluation, and the independent audit of the
annual financial statements.
62
156. Id. at art. 41 2.
157. Id. at art. 41 3.
158. Id. at art. 41 4.
159. Id. at art. 41 7. There is no provision in the law for review of the bank's
financial statements by the supervisory council.
160. See infra Parts IV.B. 1.
161. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (g)(1)(A).
162. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (g)(1)(B).
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The Basel Committee presumes that, at a minimum, the supervisory
boards of large and internationally active banks will have a specialized
audit committee. 63  According to the Basel Committee, the audit
committee is typically responsible for providing oversight of the bank's
internal and external auditors, approving their appointment,
compensation and dismissal, reviewing and approving audit scope and
frequency, receiving audit reports, and ensuring that management is
taking appropriate corrective actions in a timely manner to address
control weaknesses, non-compliance with policies, laws and regulations,
and other problems identified by auditors. To achieve sufficient
objectivity and independence, this committee should be comprised of a
majority of board members who are not executives of the bank.
Therefore, under these accepted international practices, the concept
of the revision commission should be eliminated from the Banking Law
and replaced by an audit committee, which is an independent subset of
the supervisory board.
D. Board Structure
1. Current Problems
The Banking Law does not impose any requirements on the internal
organization of supervisory .boards, currently barely meeting
internationally accepted guidelines. As the IFC Survey mentions, 50%
of Ukrainian banks have only three or four board members in total, and
only 30% have one or more independent directors.' 64 Even then, the
level of independence or the extent of influence of those directors is
suspect. The absence of legislative requirements on the specialized
board committees may help to explain the small size of supervisory
boards.
Further, currently only 18% of the banks have any supervisory
board committee. 165 It is, however, unclear whether such committees are
exclusively subordinated to the supervisory board, or have dual
163. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (July 2005), supra note 80, at
34.
164. See IFC, supra note 4, at 12.
165. See id. at 12.
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subordination to both boards.
166
2. International Norms
As the Basel Committee points out, "banks should have an adequate
number and appropriate composition of directors, who are capable of
exercising judgment independent of the views of management or
political or other outside interests."1 6 Three or four board members are
not sufficient for a bank to perform and function effectively.
Supervisory board members should not only represent the interests of
the shareholders, but also ensure that the bank is managed in such a way
as to protect the bank's depositors. The IFC recommends at least seven
members for companies with more than 1,000 shareholders, and at least
nine members for companies with more than 10,000 shareholders. For
banks, it may make more sense to base the requirements for the number
of supervisory board members on the asset size of the bank instead of on
the number of shareholders.
Therefore, the law should detail the internal organization of
supervisory boards, and in particular, set the overall number of directors,
proportion of independent directors and establish specialized board
committees.
IV. PROGRAM FOR REFORM
Correcting the current corporate-governance deficiencies in
Ukrainian banks is not an easy task. Reforms in the banking sector have
been a slow process, mainly owing to a Ukrainian parliament comprised
of representatives of the largest industrial and financial groups, many of
whom are the de facto, undisclosed beneficial owners of banks.
Unfortunately, many will continue to represent the Ukrainian people
after the parliamentary elections of 2006. At the same time, the election
of the Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko following the "Orange
Revolution" of 2004 definitely marks a turning point in Ukrainian
history. His political supporters are expecting to win a "golden share" in
the new Parliament and to lead Ukraine out of its corrupt, post-Soviet
166. Id.
167. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (July 2005), supra note 80, at 30.
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past and into a new and productive relationship with the international
community. If their plan is successful, the reform of the banking sector
is likely to quicken.
To correct current corporate governance deficiencies, the Ukrainian
Parliament should amend the Banking Law to:
1) Place responsibility for corporate strategy and operations of the
bank in the hands of properly established supervisory boards instead of
having the direct involvement of shareholders;
2) Clearly define the role and the responsibilities of the supervisory
board as a body ultimately accountable for ensuring the safety and
soundness of a bank;
3) Require the establishment of an audit committee of the
supervisory board of a bank, instead of a revision commission under the
control of the shareholders; and
4) Set requirements for an overall number of bank directors,
proportion of independent directors, and establishment of specialized
committees of the board.
The NBU, in its role as the bank regulator, should also take steps to
promote corporate governance reform. Up until now, the NBU's course
has frequently been that of inaction. For fear of making more enemies
than friends, it applies a legalistic approach that reads a statute with the
hope of finding limitations upon its authority rather than power with
which to act decisively. 168 To accelerate reforms, the NBU should try to
actively solve statutory ambiguity and take responsibility for its
interpretation of vague and inconsistent legislative provisions in a way
which promotes international standards of corporate governance. It
should also utilize its legislatively-mandated functions, such as its
authority to issue regulations and its enforcement powers to require
governance reforms in Ukrainian banks (e.g. number of bank directors,
proportion of independent directors and establishment of specialized
committees of the board, etc.). The NBU can also use banks'
dependence on their reputations and public confidence as a tool for
168. Although there are provisions to identify controlling persons and essential
participants (more than 10% ownership) of Ukrainian banks (see the Banking Law art.
2, 34), the NBU takes no steps to investigate opaque corporate ownership structures of
Ukrainian Banks. According to the NBU's own admission, it officially does not know
the owners of 2/3 of Ukrainian banks. See Alexander Dubinskiy, Trifle but Pleasantly,
ECONOMICHESKIE IZVESTIYA, Mar. 3, 2006, available at http://www.eizvestia.com/
?a=article review&id=l 6093530.
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enforcement. It is well known that everyone who does evil hates the
light. The NBU should require banks to publicly disclose their
ownership and governance structures, and let the public decide whether
such a bank is trustworthy. Finally, it can use not only a "stick" but also
a "carrot," by supervising "well managed" banks less intensively.
Bank managers and directors seeking capital additions should also
take the initiative in promoting corporate governance reforms in their
banks. They should reorganize their banks' governance and ownership
structures in a clear and understandable way, enlarge their supervisory
boards, and create specialized board committees and adequate internal
control systems. International organizations, such as USAID, the World
Bank and the IMF should also promote international corporate
governance best practices.
These reforms have the potential to correct the current corporate
governance deficiencies in Ukraine, ensure a healthy banking sector and
the safety of assets entrusted to banks, and promote democracy.
V. CONCLUSION
The "Orange Revolution" at the end of 2004 clearly demonstrated a
triumph for Western values in Ukraine. The battle between the people
and Soviet-era power structures finished with a victory for democracy.
But the victory has not automatically transformed what had been a
political autocracy into a political democracy, and transitioned the
Soviet form of economy into a market economy. Much remains to be
accomplished to eliminate cronyism and corruption, and to achieve
financial soundness and economic stability.
A sound economy is impossible without a strong banking system.
In order to function properly, the Ukrainian banking system needs
systemic corporate governance reform. Without sound corporate
governance practices, Ukrainian banks will continue to suffer crippling
shortages of capital, which will prevent the Ukrainian economy from
obtaining the capital needed to produce high quality goods. Moreover,
bank corporate governance reform could serve as the model for a much
broader reform in the corporate sector. Corporate governance reform
could increase economic efficiency and help reinforce democracy in
Ukraine.
Notes & Observations
